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Known as the “torture report,” the U.S. Senate’s December 2014 
report on the CIA’s post-9/11 interrogation program described years 
of systematic human rights abuses born from an official policy of 
torture and cruel treatment. The Obama administration ended the 
program in 2010, marking a transition away from these state-
sponsored human rights violations. In such a transitional society, it is 
crucial that the truth be available to the public and to victims to help 
them move past atrocities; the torture report may be a mechanism for 
such truth-telling. By considering similar truth-telling reports from 
other countries as well as the context of the torture report, I assess 
how this report contributed to transitional justice in four ways: by 
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School. All opinions and analysis in this paper are my own and do not reflect the views of 
any other individual or organization. I am extremely grateful to Matiangai Sirleaf, Raha 
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discovering and acknowledging past abuses, addressing the needs of 
victims, advancing accountability, and creating institutional reforms 
and promoting national reconciliation. While not perfect in any 
respect, the report has affected the way Americans view the CIA 
program, contributed to legislation banning torture, and created 
consequences for some of the program’s architects. 
INTRODUCTION 
In December 2014, the U.S. Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence (SSCI) released the executive summary, findings, and 
conclusions of its report on the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) 
interrogation program following the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks. A landmark document, the executive summary (hereafter the 
“SSCI report,” “torture report,” or “report”) is a 499-page 
documentation of abuses committed in CIA “black sites” against 
suspected terrorists and al Qaeda members. It documents the CIA’s 
use of techniques such as waterboarding; sleep deprivation for up to 
180 hours (often with the detainee’s hands shackled above his head); 
the use of stress positions and confinement (including confinement in 
small boxes); sensory deprivation; dietary manipulation; threats of 
personal harm against the detainee or his family; slapping and hitting 
detainees; exposure to extreme cold; forced nudity; repeatedly 
slamming detainees against concrete walls; and “rectal rehydration,” a 
“force feeding” technique that doctors have said is never medically 
necessary.1 At least one detainee died as a result of treatment; others 
experienced frequent vomiting, unconsciousness, hallucinations, 
panic attacks, convulsions, severe depression, and near-drowning.2 
The report also details how the CIA, the George W. Bush 
administration (hereafter Bush administration), and the Department of 
Justice authorized these techniques, as well as the CIA’s misleading 
statements to Congress, the administration, and the public about the 
program. 
 
1 See generally SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 113TH CONG., 
COMMITTEE STUDY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S DETENTION AND 
INTERROGATION PROGRAM (2014) (Executive Summary) [hereinafter SSCI REPORT]; 
Press Release, Physicians for Human Rights, CIA Torture Report Highlights Medically 
Unnecessary Procedure, (Dec. 10, 2014), http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/press/press   
-releases/cia-torture-report-highlights-unnecessary-medical-procedure.html. 
2 See generally SSCI REPORT, supra note 1. 
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The SSCI report’s champion was Senator Dianne Feinstein of 
California, then the chair of the Intelligence Committee, who worked 
for several years to have the report released. In her floor speech on 
December 9, 2014, Senator Feinstein said, “history will judge us by 
our commitment to a just society governed by law and the willingness 
to face an ugly truth and say ‘never again.’”3 In this statement she 
identified the true purpose of the report: to uncover atrocities, 
demonstrate responsibility for them, and ensure that they never 
happen again. 
Truth-telling mechanisms can be central elements in transitional 
justice, helping a society move past a period of systematic human 
rights abuses. While many forms of transitional justice take place 
after the fall of an oppressive regime or a period of civil war, this is 
not always the case.4 Truth-telling mechanisms have also been used 
after the cessation of systematic and state-sanctioned human rights 
violations, whether or not these violations accompanied a political 
transition or the end of a conflict. For example, a truth commission 
was established in Greensboro, North Carolina in 2004 to investigate 
racial attacks from the year 1979 and determine the U.S. 
government’s involvement in those attacks.5 Canada developed its 
own truth commission in 2009 to investigate the forced assimilation 
and abuse of Aboriginal populations in Canada.6 
The end of the CIA torture program did not, of course, mark the 
end of a dictatorship or oppressive political regime, and whether the 
 
3 Dianne Feinstein, Chairman Senate Intelligence Comm., Remarks on Committee 
Report on CIA Detention, Interrogation Program (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.feinstein 
.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve/?File_id=c0710e63-f518-40f5-a90d-7e788c9c91 
a3. 
4 Compare Rosemary Nagy, Transitional Justice as Global Project: Critical 
Reflections, 29 THIRD WORLD Q. 275, 277 (2008) (“[t]he view of justice associated with 
periods of political change, as reflected in the phenomenology of . . . responses  that deal 
with the wrongdoing of repressive predecessor regimes”; “that set of practices, 
mechanisms and concerns that arise following a period of conflict, civil strife or 
repression, and that are aimed directly at confronting and dealing with past violations of 
human rights and humanitarian law”; and “restoring justice within the parameters of 
peacebuilding.”) with Matiangai Sirleaf, The Truth about Truth Commissions: Why They 
Do Not Function Optimally in Post-Conflict Societies, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2263, 2265 
(2014) (Transitions “are characterized by widespread criminality and norm breaking, 
which complicates efforts to resort to the criminal justice system.”). 
5 Priscilla B. Hayner, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE 
CHALLENGE OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 62 (2001). 
6 Id. at 72−73. 
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“War on Terror” or the central conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan had 
officially ended by the time the report was released is still a subject of 
debate. However, the end of the CIA torture program did mark the 
end of a systematic policy of government-supported human rights 
abuses in the United States. The George W. Bush administration’s 
legal memos demonstrate that torture was not the work of a few rogue 
officers, but was an official, politically-supported anti-terrorism 
strategy.7 The transition to the Obama administration marked a shift 
in this policy, as one of President Obama’s first acts was to outlaw 
torture by executive order.8 
This transition, as well as Senator Feinstein’s description of the 
SSCI report as a recommitment to a “just society,” a willingness to 
face an “ugly truth,” and a way to say “never again,” identify the 
SSCI report as a form of truth-telling. This paper will examine the 
SSCI report through the lens of transitional justice. The first section 
examines the role that truth-telling can play in moving past a conflict, 
discusses whether a “right to truth” exists in international law, and 
discusses the criteria for a successful truth-seeking mechanism. The 
next four sections discuss how the SSCI report can contribute to four 
central goals of truth-telling: discovering and acknowledging past 
abuses, addressing the needs of victims, advancing accountability, 
and creating institutional reforms and promoting national 
reconciliation. 
There are many controversial debates around the CIA’s 
interrogation program, and to discuss the SSCI report in depth I 
accept several legal arguments as true, as they have been addressed 
elsewhere and are outside the scope of this paper. First, I accept that 
the CIA’s “enhanced interrogation techniques” constitute torture. 
Legal scholars, international law, and President Obama’s own 
statements support this viewpoint, though it is still a topic of some 
 
7 See, e.g., Memorandum from Stephen Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General, to John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency 
(May 10, 2005), http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/techniques.pdf [hereinafter May 10 CIA 
Memo]; Memorandum from Jay S. Baybee, Assistant Attorney General, to John A. Rizzo, 
Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency (Aug. 1, 2002), http://fas.org/irp 
/agency/doj/olc/zubaydah.pdf [hereinafter Aug. 2002 CIA Memo]; Memorandum from 
Stephen G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to John A. Rizzo, 
Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency (May 30, 2005), http://fas 
.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/article16.pdf [hereinafter May 30 CIA Memo]. 
8 Exec. Order No. 13491, 3 C.F.R. § 199 (2010). 
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debate within the United States.9 I do not intend to delve into this 
debate, nor do I accept the views of the “torture memos” prepared 
during the Bush administration that claim otherwise.10 Second, I 
accept that torture is illegal under U.S. and international law, that 
torture was illegal in the United States even before specific anti-
torture legislation was signed into law in November 2015, and that the 
post-9/11 interrogation program represented a systematic, official 
policy of employing illegal interrogation techniques.11 
Third, some of the Bush administration’s memos claim that there is 
a justification for torture under a defense of “necessity” or a “ticking 
time-bomb” scenario, in which the only way to prevent an attack on 
many innocent people is to torture one guilty individual.12 I reject this 
interpretation, as do international treaties.13 While it is understandable 
that in a post-9/11 United States, the Bush administration and even 
the American public were willing to turn to almost any mechanism to 
prevent future attacks, anti-torture laws are expressly formulated to 
protect against governments’ yielding to this temptation. This paper 
accepts legal standards that explain there is never justification for 
torture in international or domestic law, and therefore any use of 
torture constitutes a war crime or a gross human rights violation, 
regardless of the detainee or circumstance.14 
 
9 See generally Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture 
Memorandum, 1 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 455 (2005); Josh Gerstein, Obama: “We 
Tortured Some Folks,” POLITICO (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/08 
/john-brennan-torture-cia-109654.html. 
10 See May 10 CIA Memo, supra note 7; Aug. 2002 CIA Memo, supra note 7; May 30 
CIA Memo, supra note 7. 
11 Numerous U.S. laws prohibit torture, including 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2006) and the 
War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2012), as well as state, local, and federal laws 
prohibiting assault, battery, mayhem, or other crimes. International legal statutes that 
prohibit torture include the Geneva Conventions, the International Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Dec. 10, 1984, 
1465 U.N.T.S. 85), and the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 
16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-19, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967), 993 U.N.T.S. 3.), among others. 
12 May 10 CIA Memo, supra note 7. 
13 See, e.g., International Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, art. 2(2). 
14 This is not to say that all instances of CIA torture were war crimes—there is still 
extensive debate about whether all or some of the “War on Terror” constitutes an armed 
conflict. I do not intend to delve into this issue in this paper, but it is important to note that 
torture is illegal both in a state of armed conflict and outside of one. 
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I 
TRUTH-TELLING AS A FORM OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
While truth-seeking has long been a central purpose of many forms 
of transitional justice, truth-telling as a form of transitional justice in 
its own right is particularly central to the emerging concept of 
“restorative” justice. The primary aim of many judicial mechanisms 
in a restorative model is to rebuild a community rather than punish 
offenders, hold perpetrators accountable, or deter future crimes (tenets 
of “retributive” justice).15 The need for truth during a transition away 
from human rights abuses, and the creation of different bodies to 
produce official records of the truth, are “becoming the norm in 
societies emerging from periods of violent conflict or authoritarian 
rule.”16 Truth-seeking initiatives aim to create a shared memory of 
events, thought to be important for a society that hopes to move 
beyond atrocities.17 
A “right to truth” is also an emerging concept as a type of redress 
for victims. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights has recognized a 
“right to truth,” citing its importance in “[contributing] to ending 
impunity and [promoting and protecting] human rights.”18 The 
question of whether a right to truth exists under international law is 
less certain, but there is evidence to suggest a trend in that direction. 
Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions discusses the right 
of families to learn what happened to loved ones who disappeared 
under oppressive regimes.19 The Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, the U.N. Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary 
Disappearances, and the U.N. Human Rights Committee have all also 
recognized a right to truth, the latter again specifically regarding 
families learning the fate of victims of enforced disappearances or 
secret executions.20 
 
15 Gearoid Millar, Local Evaluations of Transitional Justice through Truth Telling in 
Sierra Leone: Postwar Needs and Transitional Justice, 12 HUM. RTS. REV. 515, 520 
(2011) (there is significant overlap in the goals of “restorative” and “retributive” justice, 
and in the mechanisms typically used in each one). 
16 Tim Kelsall, Truth, Lies, Ritual: Preliminary Reflections on the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 361, 362 (2005). 
17 Millar, supra note 15, at 521. 
18 UN Commission on Human Rights Res. 2005/66 (Apr. 20, 2005). 
19 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 32-33, 8 June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol 1]. 
20 Yasmin Naqvi, The Right to Truth in International Law: Fact or Fiction?, 88 INT’L 
REV. RED CROSS 245, 249, 256 (2006). 
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While the right to know what happened to disappeared family 
members is the context in which the right to truth is most often 
considered, it is not the only one.21 Interpretations of the right to truth 
by no means limit it to cases of enforced disappearance, nor do they 
limit this right to victims or their families. The right to truth can be a 
communal right, whereby an entire society has the right to understand 
what happened and ensure that similar acts are not repeated in the 
future.22 This right is also “a safeguard against impunity,” and, more 
broadly, can be violated whenever “particular information relating to 
the initial violation is not provided by the authorities, be it by the 
official disclosure of information, the emergence of such information 
from a trial or by other truth-seeking mechanisms.”23 
The SSCI report therefore can provide some form of the right to 
truth, both for individuals and for the community. It publicizes 
accounts for victims and their families; not only for those victims who 
were captured by the CIA under mysterious circumstances and those 
who died in captivity, but also for those who seek publication and 
acknowledgement of the harms that were committed against them. On 
a communal level, it allows the American people to understand what 
was committed in their name. 
The next question is how societies seek and publicize the truth. In 
many ways, truth is central to all forms of transitional justice; it is 
obviously crucial, for example, to a criminal trial.24 However, non-
judicial forms of truth-telling through mechanisms that put the truth at 
the center of their mandates have become prominent in recent years. 
Scholars differ on how they categorize and name non-judicial 
forms of truth-telling. Priscilla Hayner, founder of the International 
Center for Transitional Justice, uses the term “truth commissions” to 
encompass a wide array of truth-telling institutions. A truth 
commission, by her definition, is a body that 
(1) is focused on past, rather than ongoing, events; (2) investigates a 
pattern of events that took place over a period of time; (3) engages 
directly and broadly with the affected population, gathering 
information on their experiences; (4) is a temporary body, with the 
 
21 Id. at 256−57. 
22 Id. at 259−60. 
23 Id. at 249. 
24 Id. at 246. 
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aim of concluding a final report; and (5) is officially authorized or 
empowered by the state under review.25 
Others term some of these institutions “commissions of inquiry.” 
Hayner acknowledges that there “are a range of other kinds of official 
inquiries into past human rights abuses” that are not necessarily truth 
commissions by her definition, but that are nonetheless important and 
“may be a better approach than a truth commission, in some moments 
and some contexts.”26 Indeed, the United States has used several 
similar official inquiries to develop the truth in the past, such as the 
Commission on War-Time Relocation and Internment of Citizens in 
1982 to study World War II Japanese internment camps, and the truth 
commission in Greensboro, North Carolina.27 Additionally, many 
inquiries not officially deemed “truth commissions” nonetheless fit 
many of these criteria, and others that were called “truth 
commissions” did not meet all the requirements.28 
Therefore, the lines between the definitions of truth-seeking 
mechanisms blur sufficiently that it is difficult to pinpoint how a 
report like the SSCI report should be termed. For the purposes of this 
paper it is not necessary to specifically classify the report as one form 
of truth-seeking or another. The SSCI report meets almost all of 
Hayner’s criteria for a truth commission. The only point on which it 
fails to meet this definition is in its lack of direct engagement with the 
affected population.29 However, as mentioned, Hayner does not 
believe that failing on one criterion means that an initiative cannot be 
considered a truth commission, or that a report not specifically called 
a truth commission cannot be a valuable form of truth-telling. 
A more complicated question is whether the SSCI report fulfills the 
goals of truth-telling. While scholars vary on what they emphasize as 
goals of truth-telling, there is some consensus. Hayner says that what 
she terms “truth commissions” should achieve some or all of the 
following goals: “to discover, clarify, and formally acknowledge past 
abuses; to address the needs of victims; to “counter impunity” and 
advance individual accountability; to outline institutional 
 
25 Hayner, supra note 5, at 11−12. 
26 Id. at 14. 
27 Id. at 15, 62. 
28 See generally id. 
29 It is also true that the SSCI is not a temporary committee, being a permanent part of 
the U.S. Senate. However, for the purposes of this definition, it is effectively temporary, 
because the investigation that resulted in the report was a temporary effort with a clear end 
goal. 
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responsibility and recommend reforms; and to promote reconciliation 
and reduce conflict over the past.”30 
David Mendeloff of Carleton University, who has written 
extensively on transitional justice, notes eight main purposes of truth-
telling as a form of transitional justice: that it “(1) encourages social 
healing and reconciliation, (2) promotes justice, (3) allows for the 
establishment of an official historical record, (4) serves a public 
education function, (5) aids institutional reform, (6) helps promote 
democracy, and (7) preempts as well as (8) deters future atrocities.”31 
Robert Weiner, formerly of the Lawyers’ Committee for Human 
Rights (now Human Rights First), has said that “three steps should be 
considered minimal requisites after a period of long-standing abuse: 
an inquiry into the facts by proper authorities, an opportunity for 
victims to come forward and tell their stories, and an official finding 
of the facts.”32 
Hayner’s criteria largely encompass those of Weiner and 
Mendeloff, while occasionally outlining slightly broader goals. All 
acknowledge the importance of clarifying the past, creating a 
historical record, and official fact-finding to promote an accepted 
truth and educate the public. Weiner states that addressing the needs 
of victims may be accomplished by allowing them to come forward 
and tell their stories (though, as discussed later in this paper, this is 
not always the only or best way to help victims heal).33 Both Hayner 
and Mendeloff stress the importance of individual responsibility and 
justice, as well as institutional reforms, which can include the 
promotion of democracy. Institutional reforms, which Hayner 
stresses, are intended to achieve Mendeloff’s goal of preventing 
future atrocities (for example, by passing new legislation).34 Finally, 
promoting reconciliation and reducing conflict goes hand in hand 
with societal healing, and reducing the possibility of future atrocities. 
Because Hayner’s points generally include Mendeloff and 
Weiner’s priorities, I will use Hayner’s requirements to demonstrate 
how the SSCI report meets the goals of truth-telling. Because 
 
30 Hayner, supra note 5, at 20. 
31 David Mendeloff, Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding: 
Curb the Enthusiasm?, 6 INT’L STUD. REV. 355, 358 (2004). 
32 Thomas Antkowiak, Truth as a Right and Remedy in International Human Rights 
Experience, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 977, 997 (2002). 
33 See infra Part III. 
34 See infra Part V. 
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reconciliation and reforms tend to be intertwined, and because the 
unique context of the SSCI report may render reconciliation less 
crucial (as will be discussed below), I will discuss these two criteria 
together. 
II 
DISCOVERING AND ACKNOWLEDGING PAST ABUSES 
Hayner states that the “first and most straightforward” goal of a 
truth commission is fact-finding.35 This is especially important in the 
context of regimes that were known for forced disappearances or 
secrecy. Truth disseminated through society can effectively set the 
record straight, both for society generally and for the individual 
victims specifically.36 
However, the exact purpose of creating a record of the truth varies 
depending on the context in which it is made. In societies emerging 
from regimes characterized by secret torture and enforced 
disappearance, the truth can serve a purely educational role. In others, 
however, atrocities committed may have already been acknowledged, 
or may be an open secret. In this context, truth commissions are more 
valuable as a public acknowledgement of wrongdoing. 
For example, perhaps the best-known truth commission was the 
one created in post-apartheid South Africa. Here, 22,000 victims 
came forward to the commission with statements of wrongs done to 
them, and 1,819 were chosen to testify publicly.37 The goal of the 
South African truth commission was to promote national unity as well 
as discover the story of past events.38 Many apartheid activists, 
however, argued that the commission was not necessary to publicize 
the truth because it was impossible to not know that people had been 
tortured and disappeared under the regime.39 Rather, the 
commission’s “most important contribution was simply to remove the 
possibility of continued denial.”40 In other words, truth-telling was 
valuable even if it did not “establish” a new truth; rather, it merely 
 
35 Hayner, supra note 5, at 20. 
36 Antkowiak, supra note 32, at 997. 
37 Audrey Chapman, Truth Commissions and Intergroup Forgiveness: The Case of the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 13 PEACE AND CONFLICT: J. PEACE 
PSYCHOL. 51, 54 (2007). 
38 Id. at 52. 
39 Hayner, supra note 5, at 20−21. 
40 Id. 
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“[lifted] a veil of denial about generally known but unspoken 
events.”41 
In the wake of the U.S. torture program, both goals were important. 
While the extent and details of the atrocities committed during the 
torture program may not have been widely known, most people knew 
that suspected terrorists were imprisoned and subjected to techniques 
like sleep deprivation and waterboarding. In this sense, the SSCI 
report’s role is similar to that of the South African commission: to 
make it harder to deny the extent of the program’s brutality, rather 
than to educate the public. 
However, the American public was much less likely to know the 
extent of individual administration members’ involvement in the 
program, the ineffectiveness of the techniques used, or the extent to 
which the CIA misled the administration and the public. The CIA’s 
program also involved capturing suspected terrorists and taking them 
to secret “black sites,” so the SSCI report can serve some purpose in 
this case, particularly for families of detainees who were killed.42 
To meet both goals of a truthful account, the record created must 
meet two standards: first, it must be supported by fact and be a 
thorough analysis of the available data on the program. Second, it 
must not be perceived as one-sided or biased. If it fails on the first 
count it will fail to establish an accurate record; if it fails on the 
second it will not be accepted by society and cannot create a new 
collective understanding of what happened. The SSCI report must 
create a public record that is perceived as trustworthy and that 
permeates public consciousness to establish a complete narrative of 
the post-9/11 interrogation program. 
To answer the first question, we must consider the process of 
creating the SSCI report. The Committee staff who created the report 
reviewed the more than six million pages of CIA materials, including 
operational cables, intelligence reports, internal memoranda and 
emails, briefing materials, interview transcripts, contracts, and other 
records.43 However, while they “had access to and drew from the 
interviews of numerous CIA officials conducted by the CIA’s 
Inspector General and the CIA Oral History program on subjects that 
lie at the heart of the Committee Study, as well as past testimony to 
 
41 Antkowiak, supra note 32, at 998. 
42 See generally SSCI REPORT, supra note 1. 
43 See SSCI REPORT, supra note 1, at 9. 
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the Committee,”44 they did not actually interview any CIA officials. 
This was largely because the Department of Justice was involved in 
an ongoing investigation that precluded any discussion with those 
involved.45 
The Committee also did not interview victims. This may be 
partially explained by the fact that the Department of Defense 
generally does not allow any access to detainees still in U.S. custody 
at Guantanamo Bay, and those not in U.S. custody are scattered 
around the world, making some interviews difficult.46 It is also 
possible, though, that the Committee chose to focus on U.S. accounts 
of the program rather than victims’ to ensure that the report was 
accepted as unbiased and focused on U.S. government culpability. 
While the report was widely criticized for failing to interview CIA 
officers, the failure to interview victims is much more problematic for 
the report’s completeness and accuracy than the failure to interview 
perpetrators. Victim testimony is a hallmark of truth commissions, 
and almost every example of a truth-telling body involves some sort 
of interviews or discussions with victims.47 As Hayner points out, 
victim testimony “allows a detailed accounting of the patterns of 
violence over time and across regions, literally recording a hidden 
history.”48 
That being said, the area in which victim testimony is most 
valuable when assessing the SSCI report as an accurate record is in 
describing the extent and the brutality of previously unknown 
techniques.49 Three things are important to note here. First, as 
mentioned, many members of the American public generally knew 
what techniques the CIA used, so in this area the report may serve 
more as a public acknowledgement; victim testimony may be more 
valuable in regimes that kept their abuses more hidden. Second, 
 
44 Id. 
45 The Senate Report on CIA Torture—Frequently Asked Questions, OPEN SOCIETY 
POLICY CENTER 1, 4, http://opensocietypolicycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/SSCI-CIA    
-Torture-Report-FAQ.pdf. 
46 See, e.g., Statement of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture at the 
Expert Meeting on the Situation of Detainees Held at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo 
Bay, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Oct. 3, 2013, http://www.ohchr.org 
/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13859&LangID=E. 
47 See generally Hayner, supra note 5. 
48 Id. at 20. 
49 Note that this is not the same as assessing the value of victim testimony for victim 
catharsis or allowing the victims to feel heard. These issues will be discussed in the next 
section. 
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because the SSCI was allowed access to the CIA’s detailed records of 
the program and interrogation plans for many of the detainees, the 
drafters were able to paint a thorough picture of the brutality of the 
techniques. Finally, CIA records, while not containing full interviews 
as some truth commissions do, did contain some victim statements. 
For example, the report included the fact that some victims said 
whatever they could to make their torture stop; a piece of information 
that is crucial when discussing the effectiveness of the program.50 The 
report, therefore, is not entirely without victim perspective. 
Furthermore, interviewing victims in the absence of interviews 
with CIA personnel could have had a significant negative effect on 
the public’s perception of the report. This is the second crucial issue 
for changing public consciousness: the report must be perceived as 
trustworthy. Whether they were responsible for acts of terror, many 
Americans viewed the detainees in the torture program as the “worst 
of the worst,” those who did not deserve humane treatment because 
they were intent on attacking the United States. Victims might have 
added valuable information to the report, but including only victim 
testimony without providing the other side—accounts from American 
agents—could have been extremely damaging to the report’s 
reception. 
The failure to interview CIA agents has the opposite effect on the 
report’s reception: it is not likely to have substantially affected the 
report’s accuracy, but it may have had a negative effect on its 
perception. Many truth commissions do not seek perpetrator 
testimony at all, and find that it does not substantially add to the 
process.51 Testimony by the accused in such commissions is often 
lackluster and unhelpful to the truth-telling process.52 In South Africa, 
for example, the individuals responsible for abuses during the 
apartheid regime rarely participated in the truth-telling process.53 In 
the truth commission created after the Sierra Leonean civil war, both 
victims and perpetrators testified in front of a commission, but 
perpetrators again played a lesser role. While they nominally 
participated, the accused often downplayed their role, apologizing 
 
50 See, e.g., SSCI REPORT, supra note 1, at 215. 
51 Charles T. Call, Is Transitional Justice Really Just?, 11 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 101, 
104 (2004). 
52 See Chapman, supra note 37, at 64−65; see also Kelsall, supra note 16. 
53 Chapman, supra note 37, at 64. 
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solely for their membership in an armed group rather than their 
particular crimes, or insisting that their job was a minor one.54 
Furthermore, the Committee’s main sources were the CIA’s own 
records. While it is difficult to assess the Committee’s analysis of the 
information without seeing the full Committee study and the records 
in question, the fact that these records were used indicates that the 
lack of CIA interviews is likely not a crucial problem for the report’s 
accuracy. 
However, the failure to interview CIA agents may have had the 
unintended effect of weakening the report’s credibility. Critics of the 
report used the fact that CIA agents were not interviewed to paint the 
report as one-sided and biased.55 The CIA, which largely opposed the 
report, started preparing this negative campaign as early as the spring 
of 2014, when White House Chief of Staff Denis McDonough 
insisted that Senator Feinstein give former CIA officials the report to 
read. “Thus, they had time to prepare their rebuttal and create a Web 
site, CIA Saved Lives, before the release of the report . . . . The 
former CIA officials attacked the report as partisan” and therefore 
biased.56 At the same time, Republicans in the Senate, who were 
sometimes viewed as tougher on national security and less distracted 
by issues of human rights than Democrats, largely abandoned the 
report. While six SSCI Republicans voted in favor of the initial 
investigation, they later recused themselves, with the result that the 
report was created entirely by Democrats. When the final report was 
completed, only one Republican voted to approve it.57 
Republican senators’ statements upon the report’s release further 
enforced the message that it was one-sided and untrustworthy. Those 
who opposed the report called it, among other things, “a blatant 
attempt to smear the Bush administration” (Richard Burr of South 
Carolina);58 a Democratic attempt “to blame George W. Bush for 
everything” (Ted Cruz of Texas);59 unreliable because no Republicans 
 
54 See Kelsall, supra note 16, at 372. 
55 See Connie Bruck, The Inside War, THE NEW YORKER, June 22, 2015, http://www 
.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/22/the-inside-war. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Colin Campbell, Sen. Richard Burr wants CIA Torture Report Copies Returned, THE 
NEWS & OBSERVER, Jan 21, 2015, http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-govern 
ment/politics-columns-blogs/under-the-dome/article10228955.html. 
59 Josh Feldman, Ted Cruz on CIA Report: “Torture is Wrong, Unambiguously, Period, 
the End,” But . . . , MEDIAITE (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.mediaite.com/online/ted-cruz   
-on-cia-report-torture-is-wrong-unambiguously-period-the-end-but/. 
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had voted for it (John Hoeven of North Dakota);60 motivated by 
Democrats angry because they lost the majority in the Senate (Mark 
Kirk of Illinois);61 “politically motivated” and “one-sided” (Johnny 
Isakson of Georgia, James Risch of Indiana, and Marco Rubio of 
Florida);62 incomplete due to lack of interviews with CIA agents 
(Thom Tillis of North Carolina);63 “misleading and inaccurate” (Tim 
Scott of South Carolina);64 and “a pure political piece of crap” (Orrin 
Hatch of Utah).65 
It is more important, however, to consider the report’s impact on 
the American public. This is harder to measure. Several polls 
attempted to do so by examining U.S. attitudes toward torture before 
and after the report was released. A Washington Post poll conducted 
shortly after the release, for example, stated that the report’s impact 
was fairly low because 59% of Americans thought that the CIA’s 
techniques obtained important information that could not be obtained 
any other way.66 Furthermore, 58% thought that, in the future, these 
techniques could sometimes or occasionally be justified.67 Perhaps 
 
60 Senator Hoeven on CIA Interrogation Practices and Government Funding, C-SPAN, 
Dec. 10, 2014, http://www.c-span.org/video/?323174-5/washington-journal-senator-john   
-hoeven-rnd. 
61 Mark Kirk Calls Democrats “Little Zombies” After CIA Torture Revelations, NBC 
CHICAGO (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/Mark-Kirk-Calls          
-Democrats-Little-Zombies-for-CIA-Torture-Report-285500381.html/. 
62 News Release, U.S. Senator Johnny Isakson, Isakson on Senate Democrats’ CIA 
Detention and Interrogation Report, Dec. 9, 2014, http://www.isakson.senate.gov/public 
/index.cfm/news-releases?ID=1ff330c0-b277-4e06-8827-dbd8ecef3368; Press Release, 
James E. Risch, U.S. Senator for Idaho, Risch, Rubio Statement on Senate Intelligence 
Committee Release of Interrogation Study, Dec. 8, 2014, http://www.risch.senate.gov 
/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ContentRecord_id=2b5de0c9-ee1e-4c33-8c5e-d14f7a079 
e2d. 
63 Renee Schoof, Tillis Echoes Burr on Torture Report, THE NEWS & OBSERVER (Dec. 
10, 2014), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/politics-columns        
-blogs/under-the-dome/article10189583.html. 
64 Schuyler Kropf, CIA tactics, report’s timing draw fire, THE POST AND COURIER 
(Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.postandcourier.com/article/20141209/PC16/141209457. 
65 Stephen Collinson, Bush Era Haunts Obama, CNN POLITICS.COM (Dec. 10, 2014), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/09/politics/senate-torture-analysis/. 
66 Adam Goldman & Peyton Craighill, New Poll Finds Majority of Americans Think 
Torture was Justified After the 9/11 Attacks, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2014), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/new-poll-finds-majority-of-americans           
-believe-torture-justified-after-911-attacks/2014/12/16/f6ee1208-847c-11e4-9534-f79a23c 
40e6c_story.html. 
67 Id. 
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most concerning for the report’s impact: 47% thought that the SSCI 
report was unfair, opposed to just 36% who found it fair.68 
On the other hand, 54% of respondents felt that the CIA misled the 
White House, Congress, and the public.69 This perception could 
demonstrate that the report was more widely trusted than otherwise 
indicated. While the specific details were not public information, the 
fact that the CIA used “enhanced interrogation techniques” was fairly 
well known before the report was published. Fewer people knew the 
extent of the CIA’s deception, so a shift in public perception 
regarding the CIA’s role could be a better indication of the report’s 
impact. A Huffington Post poll found that 49% of those polled think 
the CIA has been not very or not at all truthful about its use of torture 
(and an additional 23% say it’s only been “mostly truthful”). Forty-
eight percent think the civilian government does not have control over 
the CIA, with high (29%) numbers saying they don’t know. Fifty-six 
percent believe the CIA’s torture program was illegal (although 24% 
think it was illegal but necessary).70 
The Washington Post poll was also criticized for not accurately 
measuring the public’s feelings toward torture; its numbers were 
similar to earlier polls demonstrating that people might support the 
occasional use of torture in theory, but this perception changes when 
they are presented with the individual techniques used.71 For example, 
a 2001–2009 poll showed that the vast majority of American people 
oppose the use of electric shock (81%–82%), waterboarding (58%–
81%), sexual humiliation (84%–89%), forced nudity (74%–75%), 
exposure to extreme heat or cold (58%–65%), and punching or 
kicking (69%–81%).72 A ReThink Media poll compiled the results of 
five polls conducted after the report’s release (and one in anticipation 
of its release) and found similar results: a majority of the public 
“consider[s] waterboarding (69%), sleep deprivation (70%), forced 
 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 How Americans Think About Torture, RETHINK MEDIA 3 (2014), https://rethink 
media.org/sites/default/files/Torture.ReThink%20Public%20Opinion%20Analysis.Dec201
4_0.pdf. 
71 Paul Gronke et al., No, Americans Aren’t “Fine with Torture.” They Strongly Reject 
It., WASH. POST (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp 
/2014/12/11/no-americans-arent-fine-with-torture-they-strongly-reject-it/?hpid=z3; see 
generally Paul Gronke et al., U.S. Public Opinion on Torture, 2001–2009, 43 POL. SCI. & 
POLITICS 437 (2010). 
72 Gronke, supra note 71, at 439. 
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ice baths (57%), and threatening to sexually abuse a prisoner’s mother 
(73%) forms of torture.”73 
Furthermore, a Constitution Project poll in January 2015, 
conducted after the public had more time to digest the contents of the 
report, found even stronger opposition. When questioned about the 
techniques individually, more than 70% of respondents disapproved 
of “shoving a person into a wall and hitting him in the face and 
stomach;” keeping someone awake for up to seven days, shackled and 
diapered; locking a person for hours in a box the size of a dog crate; 
and waterboarding.74 This poll also found that 67% of respondents 
supported stronger prohibitions on torture, 69% said that torture was 
immoral, and 63% said that torture weakened America’s standing in 
the world.75 
While it is still unclear how the SSCI report changed the public 
consciousness, these numbers are, on the whole, encouraging for the 
report’s status as a mechanism for truth-telling. While some members 
of the public seem to feel that torture can sometimes be justified, they 
are generally uncomfortable with many of the techniques used and are 
skeptical of the CIA’s honesty. 
Furthermore, it is important to remember that negative attitudes 
toward torture do not necessarily imply that the report was 
unsuccessful in spreading the truth about the program. The truth-
telling function of the report aims only to educate the public about 
what was done, not about the morality of these actions. It is possible 
that a fully successful form of truth-telling could educate the public 
on the CIA’s program and the majority of Americans could still feel 
that the CIA’s techniques were necessary and appropriate. 
While it is difficult to tell exactly what impact the reporting 
methods had on the public’s perception of the report and the torture 
program, it is clear that the failure to speak to both CIA agents and 
victims hindered the report’s acceptance. Interviews with CIA agents 
may have lent it credibility, which is crucial for truth-telling as a 
mechanism. The report’s failure to interview victims weakened its 
ability to tell an accurate and complete story. That said, the fact that 
 
73 RETHINK MEDIA, supra note 70, at 2–3. 
74 Results of National Survey: Views of the American Public about the Use of Torture, 
Benden Russonello Strategists (Jan. 2015), http://detaineetaskforce.org/wp-content/up 
loads/2015/01/TCP-Poll-for-release-Jan-2015.pdf?utm_source=PR%3A+Torture+Poll 
+Release&utm_campaign=PR+-+Torture+Poll+&utm_medium=email. 
75 Id. 
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torture techniques and policies were publicized using information 
from the CIA’s own records means that the report can still contribute 
to spreading the truth. These problems, therefore, are notable but not 
fatal. 
III 
ADDRESSING THE NEEDS OF VICTIMS 
A primary purpose of truth-telling in this context, historically, is to 
provide information for victims and their families. The promotion of 
truth is often viewed as a non-judicial way to help victims move past 
atrocities through testimony, acknowledgement of crimes, apologies, 
or the promise of change.76 Many believe that victim involvement and 
a “bottom-up” approach is central to the healing process.77 
As discussed, the SSCI report does not include direct victim 
testimony. It does include CIA reports of victim’s responses to 
questioning—for example, describing how victims would give false 
information when faced with torture—and some accounts of the 
effects of torture on the victims.78 However, the committee did not 
interview victims of the torture program, and none were given the 
chance to directly speak, publicly or privately, about their treatment. 
At first glance, this appears to be a major failing in the report. 
Truth-telling is largely focused on helping victims move past 
atrocities, feel heard, and have their past be publicly acknowledged. 
Historically, some victims have been eager to speak; for example, in a 
Haitian truth commission created after three years of military rule, 
victims formed long lines outside of commission offices to provide 
testimony.79 In Guatemala, commissioners reported thousands of 
individuals coming forward for public meetings.80 The Chilean 
National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation after the Pinochet 
regime, also known as the Rettig Commission, held no public 
hearings, but those who worked with victims reported that victims felt 
authorities finally heard them. This process was important to catharsis 
 
76 Hayner, supra note 5, at 22. 
77 See generally Patricia Lundy & Mark McGovern, Community-Based Approaches to 
Post-Conflict “Truth-Telling”: Strengths and Limitations, 1 SHARED SPACE: A RES. J. 
PEACE, CONFLICT, COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN N. IRELAND 35 (2010). 
78 See generally SSCI REPORT, supra note 1. 
79 Hayner, supra note 5, at 147. 
80 Id. at 147−48. 
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and healing.81 Some South African victims in the post-Apartheid truth 
and reconciliation commission also said that testifying brought 
profound relief.82 
The CIA report’s situation, however, was more complicated than 
many of these foreign examples. In most other truth commissions and 
transitional situations, the victims were members of a society who 
would remain in their country after a truth commission operated. The 
United States’ torture program was different in that its victims were 
suspected terrorists who were not members of American society. 
They did not need to re-join the public in the aftermath of the 
program. Thus, the U.S. government did not specifically seek to help 
victims move on and heal, and re-integration was not a central goal of 
the SSCI report.83 
The question is, then, whether the SSCI report can address victims’ 
needs without including their testimony. There are several factors to 
consider. First, speaking out is not universally accepted as a positive 
step for victims. There is no consensus on whether telling the truth 
helps victims move past atrocities. Though the symbolic gesture of 
the state accepting a victim’s account is important, speaking out can 
also re-traumatize victims. Some who testify in front of truth 
commissions or provide testimony to commissioners report that they 
feel worse than before.84 In El Salvador, for example, 
 [m]any victims and their relatives were not yet ready to speak 
out. The trauma of the war was too recent, and the practice of 
holding pain inside and not talking about what had happened too 
ingrained. Many people did not even make the effort to go before 
the Truth Commission, because they were not ready, because they 
did not believe the Truth Commission would do anything, or 
 
81 Truth Commission: Chile 90, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE: PUBLICATIONS 
(May 1, 1990), http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-chile-90; Hayner, 
supra note 5, at 148. 
82 Hayner, supra note 5, at 149−50. 
83 It is important to note that the fact that victims are suspected terrorists who may have 
committed crimes is irrelevant to their status as victims. International humanitarian law 
and other laws prohibiting torture do not have exceptions for criminals. See, e.g., UNITED 
NATIONS, supra note 13, at art. 2(2). (“No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether 
a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public 
emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.”). 
84 Hayner, supra note 5, at 152−55. 
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because wartime leaders failed to inform them about the 
commission’s work.85 
Furthermore, even where truth-telling is helpful to victims, it does 
not always provide all the relief they need. Victims also seek social 
change and reforms to improve their lives and prevent future 
atrocities (though these adjustments may be less important for foreign 
actors who are not part of society).86 Other criteria for successful truth 
telling can also indicate ways to help victims. Acknowledging crimes 
committed in a truthful report can be important, as can institutional 
reforms or consequences for perpetrators.87 While these points are 
addressed more thoroughly in other sections of this paper, it is worth 
acknowledging that the SSCI report succeeded, at least partially, on 
several of them. In short, while allowing victims to speak out can be 
important, it is not always necessary or sufficient for healing. 
Finally, in cases of systematic human rights violations, there is not 
necessarily just one class of victim or perpetrator. While individuals 
who were tortured are certainly victims, in a post-conflict context “it 
is necessary to expand the definition of infringement to include 
collective infringements on rights to social and collective needs, and, 
by extension, to see society itself as an actor, both a victim and a 
perpetrator.”88 The category of “victim” in the case of the CIA torture 
report also includes the American public, which was, in many ways, 
betrayed by the operation of this program and the adoption of an 
official policy of human rights violations. For this victim class, direct 
testimony is less important than factors such as creating a public 
acknowledgement of the truth, creating consequences for those 
responsible, and reforming society. 
The lack of victim testimony is a serious problem for the SSCI 
report, and, from a transitional justice perspective, it is relevant that 
the report did not specifically aim to address victims’ needs. 
However, given the report’s context, it is not necessarily a fatal fault: 
the torture program’s victims were mostly individuals who were not 
part of American society and did not seek to integrate after their 
detention, making at least some of the societal reconciliation purposes 
 
85 Margaret Popkin & Nehal Bhuta, Latin American Amnesties in Comparative 
Perspective: Can the Past Be Buried?, 13 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 99, 107 (1999). 
86 Millar, supra note 15, at 524. 
87 Hayner, supra note 5, at 21, 92. 
88 Millar, supra note 15, at 530. 
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of testimony unnecessary. Victims’ needs may also be served by other 
means, such as providing official acknowledgement of wrongdoing. 
We must also remember that, as discussed in the previous section, 
interviews with victims could have significantly undermined the 
report’s credibility in the eyes of the public. While it is difficult to 
weigh the costs to victims against the benefits of not including victim 
testimony, there is a tradeoff to be made here. The SSCI report’s 
context may demonstrate the need for a revised model that places less 
of an emphasis on victims’ needs when the victims are not part of the 
society. In such a model, this failing may not be as detrimental as 
transitional justice theory suggests. 
IV 
ADVANCING ACCOUNTABILITY 
Many believe that successful truth-telling should lead to some 
consequence for perpetrators. This is a challenging goal, as it can 
overlap with other distinct forms of transitional justice (such as 
prosecutions). However, available consequences are not limited to a 
criminal justice system response. As Hayner points out, some 
commissions pass their files on to prosecutors, but others recommend 
sanctions or other non-criminal consequences.89 Consequences may 
also take the form of a public apology, reparations to victims, the loss 
of a job, loss of reputation, or mere “naming and shaming.” It is 
important, however, to have some form of consequence: “[m]any 
victims feel that just truth-telling without any other monetary 
response or form of payment by the perpetrators is not useful; 
apologies are also more helpful than just truth-telling.”90 The same 
goes for the American public; some acknowledgement of wrongdoing 
should be provided to move the country beyond this program of 
abuse. 
Many truth commissions have led to these forms of “soft” justice—
requiring perpetrators to retire, or simply naming them publicly.91 For 
example, a Brazilian report released on December 10, 2014—
 
89 Hayner, supra note 5, at 22−23. 
90 Antkowiak, supra note 32, at 1000. 
91 For example, El Savaldor, Argentina, and Brazil; Popkin & Bhuta, supra note 85, at 
105, 108−09; Dom Phillips, Brazil Confronts Horrors of the Past with Torture Report’s 
Release, TIME (Dec. 10, 2014), http://time.com/3629031/brazil-torture-report-truth            
-commission/; Brazil Truth Commission: Abuse “Rife” under Military Rule, BBC NEWS 
(Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-30410741. 
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coincidentally one day after the SSCI report, and also termed a 
“torture report”—specifically identifies 377 people by name.92 
Individuals involved in past Chilean regimes have suffered a loss of 
reputation or, in some cases, more concrete measures such as the loss 
of a job.93 The Salvadoran Commission on the Truth, which was 
created as a formal part of the 1992 peace accords following the 
Salvadoran Civil War, eventually recommended that 103 people in 
the government be removed and suggested the creation of a more 
formal Truth Commission to produce a report.94 While results were 
mixed, eventually some of these 103 individuals were forced to retire. 
There are many possible consequences available for punishing 
perpetrators, and therein lies the SSCI report’s greatest failure. There 
have been very few consequences for the CIA perpetrators of the 
torture program, and almost none that the government initiated. There 
are many people who were in positions of power who contributed to 
this program and now have left, but they largely did so because of the 
end of the Bush administration or their retirement, not due to the 
report or the CIA’s program. No one was forced from a job due solely 
to the SSCI report and no one was forced to pay reparations. 
One of the SSCI report’s claims was that the CIA did not hold 
individuals accountable during the program, and the CIA largely 
agreed with this statement.95 However, the CIA was also quick to 
point out accountability measures it did take. The CIA convened six 
accountability procedures from 2003–2012, assessing 30 individuals 
and finding 16 accountable; it sanctioned these people with 
“administrative actions.”96 The CIA response to the report also states 
that the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted two major 
and 29 minor reviews, and the CIA referred individuals to the OIG 
and corrected harmful practices. This, the report mentions, did “lead 
 
92 Dom Phillips, Brazil Confronts Horrors of the Past with Torture Report’s Release, 
TIME (Dec. 10, 2014), http://time.com/3629031/brazil-torture-report-truth-commission/; 
Brazil Truth Commission: Abuse “Rife” under Military Rule, BBC NEWS (Dec. 10, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-30410741. 
93 Mark Ensalaco, Truth Commissions for Chile and El Salvador: A Report and 
Assessment, 16:4 HUM. RTS. Q. 656, 664−65 (1994). 
94 Popkin & Bhuta, supra note 85, at 104. 
95 See generally SSCI REPORT, supra note 1, at 277; THE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, Memorandum on CIA Comments on the Senate Select 
Committee Intelligence Report on the Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Program 14 
(June 27, 2013). 
96 THE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 95, at 9. 
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to tensions” between the CIA and OIG, but nothing that prevented the 
OIG from continuing its work.97 
While the OIG found most of the cases it examined to be without 
merit, the CIA response mentions three in which action was taken. In 
one, an individual beat an Afghan prisoner to death; this person was 
referred to the Department of Justice and found guilty of a felony.98 In 
another, a contractor who had “slapped, kicked, and struck” detainees 
was terminated, had his clearances revoked, and was put on a 
contractor watch list.99 Finally, after Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri was 
threatened with an electric drill and a pistol (an account described in 
detail in the SSCI report), the junior officer involved was prevented 
from receiving a raise or a promotion for two years, suspended 
without pay for a week, and removed from the program (the senior 
officer involved had retired).100 
Despite outlining these consequences, the CIA’s response to the 
SSCI report also admits “significant shortcomings in [the] CIA’s 
handling of accountability for problems in the conduct and 
management of [the] CIA’s RDI [rendition, detention, and 
interrogation] activities.”101 The CIA’s response takes the SSCI 
report’s conclusions a step further by adding that the “[a]gency did 
not sufficiently broaden and elevate the focus of its accountability 
efforts to include more senior officers who were responsible for 
organizing, guiding, staffing, and supervising RDI activities.”102 
The CIA’s response specifically highlighted that individuals should 
have been held accountable for the death of Gul Rahman, a detainee 
who died in CIA custody.103 In this case, CIA management decided to 
overturn an accountability board recommendation on grounds that it 
was inappropriate to punish a junior officer for following orders 
(indeed, one officer in charge received a $2,500 “cash award” for 
“consistently superior work”).104 In its response to the SSCI report, 
the CIA acknowledged that this distinction had merit; however, the 
organization stated that even the most junior officer must have been 
 
97 Id. at 10. 
98 Id. at 44. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 46. 
101 Id. at 8. 
102 Id.  
103 Id. at 9. 
104 Id. at 9; SSCI REPORT, supra note 1, at 55. 
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in some way accountable in this case, and the CIA “had an 
affirmative obligation to look more deeply into the leadership 
decisions that helped shape the environment in which the junior 
officer was required to operate . . . and to determine what 
responsibility, if any, should be fixed at a more senior level.”105 
Furthermore, the response said that individuals with broader 
accountability for the program should have been held responsible.106 
The gaps pointed to in the CIA’s response do not indicate a failure 
of the SSCI report—there was a lack of accountability before the 
report was released. They do suggest, however, that the SSCI report 
and the CIA’s response could have provided post-report 
accountability or a reform of accountability measures in the CIA. 
However, the CIA stated that it would now not be “practical or 
productive to revisit any RDI-related case so long after the events 
unfolded.”107 
The Department of Justice conducted an investigation into the 
torture program from 2008–2012. The prosecutor, John Durham, 
found that there were no grounds under which to file charges.108 After 
the SSCI report was released, there were calls to reopen the Durham 
investigation. Instead, the Department of Justice said in a statement 
that after seeing the report, they “did not find any new information 
that they had not previously considered in reaching their 
determination.”109 
There have been some non-criminal consequences for those 
involved in the torture program. Many Bush administration officials 
were named in the report; for example, the report describes the 
memos, emails, and statements of key players such as President Bush, 
Vice President Cheney, Condoleezza Rice, and former CIA directors 
Porter Goss and Michael Hayden. It also names lawyers in the CIA, 
White House, and Department of Justice, including John Rizzo, 
Stephen Bradbury, and John Yoo, the author of the infamous “torture 
memos” that argued that the techniques used did not constitute 
torture. Most people were already aware of the involvement of these 
 
105 THE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 95, at 9. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 8. 
108 Charlie Savage, U.S. Tells Court that Documents from Torture Investigation Should 
Remain Secret, N.Y. TIMES: POLITICS (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12 
/11/us/politics/us-tells-court-that-documents-from-torture-investigation-should-remain       
-secret.html. 
109 Id. 
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individuals before the report (the “torture memos” were public, for 
example), and each now enjoys retirement or continued work outside 
the federal government. The only possible detriment to these 
individuals’ legacies is the public’s view that the CIA lied about the 
program.110 It is worth noting that this is only a potential consequence 
for those in the CIA, not in the White House or Justice Department. 
The issue of naming other involved individuals in the report was a 
contentious one, and demonstrates another shortcoming of the report. 
Senator Feinstein fought the administration for months over the issue 
of pseudonyms. Though she did not urge the administration to use 
CIA officers’ names, she did encourage the use of consistent 
pseudonyms so that readers could construct a narrative of what 
happened.111 This failed: the issue proved such a sticking point that it 
became a barrier to the report’s being published at all.112 Aside from 
the high-level Bush administration officials mentioned, and a few 
select other individuals, all names and locations in the report are 
blacked out. 
The SSCI report had one success in creating consequences, though, 
and that is due to its discussion of two contract psychologists who 
designed the interrogation program, whom media identified as John 
“Bruce” Jessen and James E. Mitchell.113 The report publicized the 
extraordinarily high fee for their work and their lack of experience in 
interrogation, points that the news media seized upon.114 Even the 
CIA’s response to the report acknowledged that there was a lack of 
oversight in the work of independent contractors.115 If there is an 
example of successful “naming and shaming” by the CIA report, it is 
 
110 Cf. Goldman & Craighill, supra note 66. 
111 Bruck, supra note 55, at 19. 
112 Id. at 22. 
113 See, e.g., Robert Windrem, CIA Paid Torture Teachers More Than $80 Million, 
NBC NEWS, Dec. 9, 2014, http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/cia-torture-report/cia-paid   
-torture-teachers-more-80-million-n264756; Mark Mazzetti, Panel Faults C.I.A. Over 
Brutality and Deceit in Terrorism Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES: WORLD (Dec. 9, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/10/world/senate-intelligence-committee-cia-torture         
-report.html. 
114 See, e.g., Joseph Tanfani & W.J. Hennigan, Two Psychologists’ Role in CIA Torture 
Program Comes into Focus, L.A. TIMES: WORLD (Dec. 14, 2014), http://www.latimes 
.com/world/afghanistan-pakistan/la-fg-torture-psychologists-20141214-story.html#page 
=1; James Risen & Matt Apuzzo, C.I.A., on Path to Torture, Chose Haste over Analysis, 
N.Y. TIMES: POLITICS (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/16/us/politics 
/cia-on-path-to-torture-chose-haste-over-analysis-.html?_r=0. 
115 THE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 95, at 24. 
SEYFARTH (DO NOT DELETE) 8/29/2017  11:25 AM 
124 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 18, 99 
that of Jessen and Mitchell. It is worth noting, however, that at the 
time the report was released both were retired and the firm they 
created together had already been disbanded.116 
In October 2015, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed 
a suit against Mitchell and Jessen (Salim v. Mitchell) on behalf of 
three victims of the CIA torture program. The suit, filed under the 
Alien Tort Statute, accuses Mitchell and Jessen of torture; cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment; non-consensual human 
experimentation; and war crimes.117 The complaint describes the 
SSCI report in detail and cites it 38 times.118 In April 2016, the U.S. 
government said it would allow the case to go forward, choosing not 
to invoke the “state secrets privilege” to block the case. In every 
previous torture-related case, the Bush and Obama administrations 
had claimed that considering the case would involve divulging state 
secrets, so this was an unprecedented development. The ACLU stated 
its belief that the SSCI report was to thank for this change.119 Should 
the suit proceed, and Mitchell and Jessen be forced to pay reparations, 
this would be a significant and groundbreaking consequence that 
could lead to other civil cases against the contractors involved in the 
torture program. 
The government’s failure to invoke state secrets was significant, 
and demonstrated an important win for the impact of the SSCI report 
on accountability. Unfortunately, the civil suit and public disdain for 
Jessen and Mitchell are possibly the SSCI report’s only tangible 
consequences for perpetrators. This greatly lessens the report’s 
potential impact. 
V 
CREATING INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS AND PROMOTING NATIONAL 
RECONCILIATION 
Another crucial aspect of truth-telling is the promotion of 
institutional reforms. This is a hallmark of many of the Latin 
American truth-telling mechanisms, though “[s]uccessful 
 
116 Tanfani & Hennigan, supra note 114. 
117 Salim v. Mitchell—Lawsuit Against Psychologists Behind CIA Torture Program, 
ACLU: CASES (Oct. 13, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/cases/salim-v-mitchell-lawsuit          
-against-psychologists-behind-cia-torture-program. 
118 Compl. Salim v. Mitchell, 2:15-CV-286-JLQ (E.D. Wash. Oct. 13, 2015). 
119 Dror Ladin, The Government’s Unprecedented Position in CIA Torture Lawsuit is 
Very Good News, ACLU (Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/blog/speak-freely/govern 
ments-unprecedented-position-cia-torture-lawsuit-very-good-news. 
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implementation of truth commission recommendations . . . continues 
to be weak.”120 For example, the Chilean National Commission for 
Truth and Reconciliation was intended to gather evidence and then 
make recommendations for institutional reform (despite an included 
mandate that prevented naming those responsible).121 It succeeded by 
leading to eventual reforms and the creation of a reparations program 
for victims.122 
In other cases, recommendations have had a lesser impact. In 
Argentina, for example, the Alfonsín government created a national 
commission to investigate disappearances and ultimately convicted 
five junta leaders. Several years later, all investigations were 
terminated and those who had been convicted were released.123 
Peru also established a Truth Commission to investigate atrocities 
committed by the government, the Shining Path Maoist movement, 
and the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement between May 1980 
and November 2000. The Commission recommended reparations and 
reconciliation, noting that most of the affected were those who tended 
to be marginalized in society.124 Significantly, the Peruvian 
Government pursued many of these recommendations, prosecuting 
several of those involved, issuing a public apology, and setting up a 
register for reparations (though the latter is proceeding slowly).125 
However, while Peru’s commission is recognized as one of the more 
successful examples of truth-telling, some “traditional political 
sectors and some local elites” still oppose its findings.126 
Despite including descriptions of many internal CIA problems, and 
the CIA’s acknowledgment of the need for institutional reforms, there 
 
120 Hayner, supra note 5, at 23. 
121 UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, TRUTH COMMISSION: CHILE 90, supra note 
81; Margaret Popkin & Nehal Bhuta, Latin American Amnesties in Comparative 
Perspective: Can the Past Be Buried?, 13 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 99, 112 (1999); Mark 
Ensalaco, Truth Commissions for Chile and El Salvador: A Report and Assessment, 16 
HUM. RTS. Q. 656, 658 (1994). 
122 UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, TRUTH COMMISSION: CHILE 90, supra note 
81. 
123 Popkin & Bhuta, supra note 121, at 108−09. 
124 UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, TRUTH COMMISSION: CHILE 90, supra note 
81. 
125 Truth Commission: Peru 01, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, UNITED 
STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, TRUTH COMMISSION: PERU 01, http://www.usip.org 
/publications/truth-commission-peru-01 (last visited Apr. 26, 2016). 
126 Ten Years after Peru’s Truth Commission, ICTJ (Aug. 19, 2014), https://www.ictj 
.org/news/ten-years-after-peru-truth-commission. 
SEYFARTH (DO NOT DELETE) 8/29/2017  11:25 AM 
126 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 18, 99 
is no evidence that the SSCI report has led to notable changes inside 
the CIA.127 CIA Director John Brennan has made some changes 
within the agency, primarily reducing the separation between CIA 
analysts and operations. However, it is unclear if this change is at all 
related to the torture program, and some feel that it might work to 
facilitate the program’s repetition: “Had there been a separation 
between analysts and operations officers [at the time of the torture 
program], it would have been easier for analysts to assess whether the 
interrogation program really was saving thousands of innocent 
lives.”128 
Outside of the CIA, institutional reform is arguably the SSCI 
report’s greatest result. In June 2015, the Senate voted on Amendment 
1889, an Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2016.129 The amendment, which Senator 
John McCain introduced and Senator Feinstein (among several 
others) cosponsored, codified President Obama’s Executive Order 
13491 by making the Army Field Manual the standard for 
interrogation practices for all branches of the government, including 
the CIA.130 The amendment also required International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) access to all detainees.131 In a landslide vote, 
the amendment passed with the support of 78 Senators (all 44 
Democrats, both Independents, and 32 Republicans). Twenty-one 
Senators, all Republican, voted against the amendment.132 In 
November, President Obama signed the act into law. 
 
127 See generally The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum for: 
The Honorable Dianne Feinstein, The Honorable Saxby Chambliss, Subject: The CIA on 
the Senate Select Committee Intelligence Report on the Rendition, Detention, and 
Interrogation Program (June 27, 2013), https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/CIAs_June 
2013_Response_to_the_SSCI_Study_on_the_Former_Detention_and_Interrogation_Pro 
gram.pdf [hereinafter CIA Response to SSCI Report]. 
128 Matteo Faini, John Brennan’s Reforms Would Turn the CIA into a Paramilitary 
Organization, THE WEEK (Mar. 30, 2015), http://theweek.com/articles/546728/john           
-brennans-reforms-turn-cia-into-paramilitary-organization. 
129 S. Amdt.1889 to S. Amdt.1463, 114th Cong. (2015). 
130 S. Amdt.1889 to S. Amdt.1463, 114th Cong. (2015), Order No. 13491, 3 C.F.R. § 
199 (2010). 
131 S. Amdt.1889 to S. Amdt.1463, 114th Cong. (2015). 
132 United States Senate, U.S. Senate: Roll Call Votes 114th Congress−1st Session, 
Vote Summary, Question: On the Amendment (McCain Amdt. No. 1887), http://www 
.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=114&session 
=1&vote=00209 [hereafter Roll Call] (Marco Rubio, Republican of Florida, did not vote, 
though he later said he would have opposed the Amendment). 
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This is a positive change, but the question remains as to whether it 
is a direct result of the release of the SSCI report. On one level, the 
link between the two is clear. Shortly after the release of the SSCI 
report, on December 30, 2014, Senator Feinstein introduced proposed 
reforms that would address the issue of torture.133 She presented the 
reforms in a letter to President Obama, which stated, “I write today to 
describe and transmit the recommendations derived from the 
Committee’s report.”134 The reforms proposed would have made the 
Army Field Manual the standard for interrogation, closed purported 
loopholes that allowed the Bush administration to authorize the use of 
torture, demanded ICRC access to all detainees, and prohibited the 
CIA from detaining any individuals.135 Of these, only the prohibition 
on CIA detention was not included in the amendment introduced in 
June.136 It is clear, therefore, that the release of the SSCI report 
ensured that the issue of torture was in the public consciousness and 
influenced a push for strengthening its prohibition. 
A more complicated question, however, is how much the SSCI 
report influenced the process of passing of the Amendment, beyond 
its mere introduction. As discussed, the report was by no means 
widely accepted and trusted, especially by Republicans. It is possible 
that while the report created a stage onto which legislation could be 
introduced, the manner of its release and its methods may have 
actually harmed the amendment’s passing. To examine this idea, I 
will consider statements by Republican senators, either on the report’s 
release or on the McCain-Feinstein Amendment.137 Of course, it is 
impossible to tell how many of these votes were influenced by the 
report or a genuine desire to ban torture, and how many were 
otherwise motivated. For example, some senators may not have 
wanted to defy Senator McCain—a leading anti-torture Republican 
and Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee—or may have 
sought to vote in a way that would give them more political capital. 
 
133 Dianne Feinstein, United States Senator for California, Press Release: Feinstein 
Proposes Reforms to Prevent Future Use of Torture (Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.feinstein 
.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=0084e644-a5ed-46e1-8649-762df3ffcf4f. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 S. Amdt.1889 to S. Amdt.1463, 114th Cong. (2015). 
137 Democrats were largely in support of both the report and the Amendment; in fact, 
no Democrats voted against the Amendment’s passing, so their statements are less relevant 
to this consideration. 
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Among Republican senators who supported the McCain-Feinstein 
Amendment, only two made statements that suggested they supported 
the CIA program and use of torture after the report was released. 
Chuck Grassley of Iowa said that he supported “anything that is legal 
for American citizens under the Constitution or for combatants under 
the Geneva Conventions,” including techniques authorized by the 
Bush administration’s torture memos,138 and Johnny Isakson of 
Georgia stated that the program, “despite what this report alleges, 
helped develop intelligence that led to action against threats to our 
national security.”139 These statements seem contradictory given the 
senators’ support for the amendment, but they may indicate a more 
general support for the CIA (and an acknowledgement that there were 
a few successes in the program) without necessarily supporting the 
techniques used. 
The majority of Republican senators who both voted in favor of 
this amendment and also criticized the SSCI report pointed to the 
report’s methods and described it as partisan without actually 
commenting on the use of torture. At least three senators, John 
Hoeven of North Dakota, Mark Kirk of Illinois, and Thom Tillis of 
North Carolina, stated they thought the report was biased, but they did 
not discuss torture as a strategy.140 Others criticized the report itself 
while saying simultaneously that they did not support torture. For 
example, Ted Cruz of Texas said that the report was biased but that 
torture was “unambiguously wrong”141 and Kelly Ayotte of New 
Hampshire criticized the timing of the report’s release but also said, “I 
support taking off the table the things that were used like torture, and 
I don’t think we should use those types of methods.”142 These votes 
 
138 Joseph Morton, Grassley, King Back CIA Methods; Fischer Blasts Torture Report 
as “One-Sided,” But Harkin Praises its Release, OMAHA.COM (Dec. 10, 2014), 
http://www.omaha.com/news/iowa/grassley-king-back-cia-methods-fischer-blasts-torture  
-report-as/article_0c492294-7fe8-11e4-b1db-e7e594b6e423.html; Roll Call, supra note 
132. 
139 Isakson, supra note 62; Roll Call, supra note 132. 
140 Senator Hoevan on CIA Interrogation Practices, supra note 60; Mark Kirk Calls 
Democrats “Little Zombies,” supra note 61; Schoof, supra note 63; Roll Call, supra note 
132. 
141 Feldman, supra note 59; Roll Call, supra note 132. 
142 Roll Call, supra note 132; Michael Brindley, Shaheen Calls CIA Torture Report 
“Disturbing,” Ayotte Concerned about Timing, NEW HAMPSHIRE PUBLIC RADIO (Dec. 10, 
2014), http://nhpr.org/post/shaheen-calls-cia-torture-report-disturbing-ayotte-concerned      
-about-timing; Ayotte Pushes for Strong Foreign Policy in Speech to the Ripon Society, 
THE RIPON SOCIETY (June 25, 2014), http://www.riponsociety.org/2014/06/ayotte-pushes 
-for-a-strong-foreign-policy-in-speech-to-the-ripon-society/. 
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suggest that while some opposed the way the report was created and 
its release, they were still opposed to the tactics described. 
Interestingly, two senators who voted in favor of the amendment 
made comments suggesting that they supported torture before the 
report came out: Richard Burr of North Carolina said in 2011 that he 
believed that torture directly led to the capture of Osama bin Laden,143 
and Pat Toomey of Pennsylvania said in 2009 that he thought 
waterboarding led to valuable information.144 The shift from their 
support of torture to voting in favor of its abolition suggests that the 
SSCI report may have been instrumental in changing some minds, 
though, of course, it is impossible to know their motivation. 
Not surprisingly, many of the Republicans who voted against the 
amendment made comments supporting the CIA’s interrogation 
program and indicated an inclination to repeat it. Tom Cotton of 
Arkansas said on the subject, “We shouldn’t celebrate having to use 
such harsh interrogation techniques, but they’re not torture, and if 
they save an American life, then an American president should use 
them to protect America and keep our citizens safe.”145 Mitch 
McConnell of Kentucky said, “The fact that the CIA’s Detention and 
Interrogation program developed significant intelligence that helped 
us identify and capture important al Qaeda terrorists, disrupt their 
ongoing plotting, and take down Osama Bin Laden is 
incontrovertible. Claims included in this report that assert the contrary 
are simply wrong.”146 Marco Rubio of Florida, who did not vote, 
commented that he would have opposed the amendment because he 
did not want to deny future interrogators any tools.147 He later added 
 
143 Patrick Allen, Enhanced Interrogations Led to Bin Laden Kill: Senator, CNBC 
(May 3, 2011), http://www.cnbc.com/id/42871400; Roll Call, supra note 130; Campbell, 
supra note 58. 
144 John L. Micek & Lauren Boyer, Toomey: Waterboarding Got the Job Done, THE 
MORNING CALL (May 19, 2009), http://articles.mcall.com/2009-05-19/news/4375837_1 
_waterboarding-prosecute-specter. 
145 Roll Call, supra note 132; Tom Cotton Talks CIA Torture Report, NEXSTAR 
BROADCASTING (Dec. 14, 2014), http://www.nwahomepage.com/fulltext-news/d/story 
/tom-cotton-talks-cia-torture-report/38973/7MeDac8SrU6gmZP_-Wet0w. 
146 Chambliss, McConnell React to Public Release of Senate Democrats’ CIA 
Detention and Interrogation Report (Dec. 9, 2014), http://justsecurity.org/wp-content/up 
loads/2014/12/Statement-by-Sens-Mitch-McConnell-and-Saxby-Chambliss-on-the-SSCI   
-report.pdf; Roll Call, supra note 132. 
147 Chris Adams, Although He Missed Vote, Rubio Would Have Said No on Anti-
Torture Measure, MIAMI HERALD (June 16, 2015), http://miamiherald.typepad.com  
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that if elected president he would use “enhanced interrogation” 
techniques.148 John Cornyn of Texas and Deb Fischer of Nebraska 
also said that they felt the interrogation techniques gained valuable 
information, and James Inhofe of Oklahoma claimed that he was 
“very supportive of enhanced interrogation.”149 However, Inhofe later 
commented that he opposed the McCain-Feinstein Amendment not 
because he supported torture, but because he did not want techniques 
in the Army Field Manual to be made public. This suggests that some 
of those who supported the CIA’s program did not necessarily think 
these techniques should be used again.150 
Roy Blunt of Montana, Orrin Hatch of Utah, and James Risch of 
Indiana all voted against the amendment and made statements 
criticizing the report’s methods as partisan.151 Risch, however, also 
made a statement vehemently opposing the use of torture.152 
Furthermore, several senators who opposed the amendment stated 
that they specifically did not intend to support torture, but disagreed 
with other aspects of the legislation, rather than the report itself. 
Lindsey Graham of South Carolina said that he did not agree with 
using the Army Field Manual as a standard for interrogation; David 
Vitter of Louisiana said he did not want to broadcast techniques by 
allowing the manual to remain public; and James Lankford of 
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Oklahoma stated that he “vehemently opposed torture” but thought 
the amendment could have “unintended consequences.”153 
It seems, therefore, that the report’s perceived partisanship and bias 
did not hugely influence the way senators voted. Senators who 
criticized the SSCI report were relatively split in their votes on the 
amendment. Several other “no” votes were due to issues unrelated to 
the report, such as the publication of the Army Field Manual. The 
biggest split between supporters and non-supporters was a stated 
belief in the value of torture. Even so, support for torture was not 
necessarily indicative of a “no” vote: while at least five Republicans 
who stated that they supported the CIA’s program voted against the 
amendment, two stated their support for torture and voted for it, and 
several others mentioned that they felt the CIA saved lives but did 
comment on their support of the techniques used. 
Thus, even if the report did not directly help the passage of the 
amendment, it does not seem to have greatly hurt it either. Finding the 
report partisan or biased was, in general, not a persuasive reason for 
an individual to vote against the amendment. While it is difficult to 
know the true motives of the involved politicians, it seems that the 
report may have had a positive effect in making some people, even 
those who opposed the amendment, believe that torture was wrong 
and should not be repeated. 
Furthermore, it is clear that the report led to the introduction of the 
amendment, so even if its effect on the vote was neutral, its ultimate 
influence on institutional reforms was positive. This seems to be the 
area where the SSCI report was most successful as a truth-telling 
measure, despite not being as influential as hoped in changing the 
public’s views. Though a better methodological approach would have 
also certainly helped it gain more support in the senate, it nonetheless 
helped achieve a concrete measure to ban an official torture policy. 
Reconciliation goes hand with reforms. As Hayner discusses, 
“breaking the cycle of revenge and hatred between former enemies” 
through reconciliation is one way to deter future violence and prevent 
 
153 Alex Rogers, Another 2016 GOP Fault Line: Torture, NATIONAL JOURNAL (June 
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Vitter, No, NOLA.COM (June 16, 2015), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/06 
/senate_votes_to_ban_torture_ca.html. 
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future human rights abuses, but “[m]ore concretely, most 
commissions recommend reforms in the military police, judiciary, and 
political systems in the hope of preventing former abuses.”154 
Reconciliation and reforms, therefore, are two methods of breaking 
the cycle of abuse and “[n]ot all commissions have been built around 
an assumption or priority of advancing reconciliation.”155 
Hayner also distinguishes between individual and national or 
political reconciliation.156 The SSCI report presents an interesting 
challenge in the former. The detainees who were tortured under the 
CIA’s program were suspected terrorists or alleged international 
criminals who, the CIA believed, sought to harm the United States.157 
This does not change the detainee’s status as victims, but it does mean 
that traditional reconciliation is not as prominent a goal. In the case of 
most truth commissions, the victims analyzed were citizens of the 
countries that oppressed them, and reconciling with the government 
and creating a unified society was crucial. The CIA’s foreign 
detainees did not necessarily need to make peace with their captors 
the U.S. government, and they and the United States do not seek to 
become a societal whole. 
The discussion of the SSCI report should, therefore, focus on 
political or societal reconciliation, a return to respect for human 
rights, and closure for the American people who unknowingly 
sponsored the use of torture. As Hayner points out, reconciliation on a 
political level rests in the creation of a truthful and acknowledged 
report: “An official accounting and conclusion about the facts can 
allow opposing parties to debate and govern together without latent 
conflicts and bitterness over past lies.”158 
While the statements by the report’s opposition are not necessarily 
free of bitterness, the conversations about the SSCI report were 
centered almost entirely around its initial release and the vote on the 
McCain-Feinstein Amendment. It did not remain a point of argument 
in the Senate. When the NDAA was sent to President Obama for his 
signature, the amendment was not a point of contention. Of course, 
the torture program itself did not greatly affect American political 
structures, (as some other campaigns of massive human rights 
 
154 Hayner, supra note 5, at 182. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 183. 
157 Note, of course, that some were innocent. 
158 Hayner, supra note 5, at 183. 
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violations have) and the fact that the victims of the program are not 
part of American society may contribute to this peacefulness. 
However, the fact that the amendment passed with such a wide 
margin and with bipartisan support suggests that either the report has 
created some political reconciliation, or that such reconciliation was 
not necessary in the first place. 
As Hayner mentions, not all truth-seeking bodies automatically 
include reconciliation as a goal. The fact that the torture program’s 
victims are not part of American society largely negates the need for 
such reconciliation on an individual basis, and the torture program 
does not continue (and perhaps never began) to cause substantial 
animosity on a political basis to the extent that it prevents moving on 
to other issues. Reconciliation, therefore, is not an issue that 
substantially affects the SSCI report’s effectiveness; in moving past 
abuses and towards peace, the political reforms that it led to are much 
more relevant. 
CONCLUSION 
All forms of truth-telling are imperfect in some way. The SSCI 
report’s flaws should not be seen as a failure of transitional justice. 
After all, it did achieve some significant success, and its triumphs are 
important to learning how truth-telling as a post-conflict mechanism 
should evolve. The report contributed significantly to anti-torture 
legislation, and it was crucial in bringing the CIA’s torture program 
into the public consciousness. There have been some consequences 
for the program’s architects (albeit only a few of them). This 
demonstrates that even if some perceive it as partisan or biased, it has 
some tangible impact. 
However, the report’s shortcomings must be acknowledged, even if 
only to consider the best course for future truth-telling. The failure to 
interview victims meant that they had no outlet to explain what 
happened to them, and weakened the report’s ability to help victims 
move on. The report did not name the majority of the perpetrators, 
and there have been very few consequences for them. Its victory in 
contributing to legislation may be somewhat marred by the fact that 
many senators, even those who supported the McCain-Feinstein 
Amendment, were quick to point out that they did so more or less in 
spite of the SSCI report. Its impact on public opinion is also 
uncertain, and many perceive it as partisan and untrustworthy. 
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That being said, the SSCI report provides important lessons for 
future truth-telling mechanisms. First, it is crucial for a report’s 
integrity and credibility, as well as its impact on victims, that it collect 
information from both victims and perpetrators. While collecting 
information from victims may be more important in gaining a 
complete picture of what happened, since perpetrators are less likely 
to be cooperative, interviewing perpetrators aids in a report’s 
credibility and the public’s perceptions of its impartiality. There is 
little point to a truth-telling report if no one believes it. 
Second, if at all possible, individuals involved in the program must 
be named. This in itself may lead to sufficient consequences for 
perpetrators and catharsis for victims. Unfortunately, a document like 
the SSCI report is significantly less helpful in achieving the goals of 
truth-telling when all but the most obvious individuals involved are 
anonymous. That being said, SSCI staff cannot be faulted in being 
denied the chance to interview those involved or being forced to use 
pseudonyms. 
Truth-telling is an area where the perfect should not be the enemy 
of the good; the report’s release was important and its achievements 
should not be downplayed. In many ways, there is no “right” or 
“only” way to achieve post-conflict truth-telling, and some of the 
SSCI report’s shortcomings, had they been corrected in according 
with transitional justice norms, could have prevented its very 
existence. The report’s role in propelling anti-torture legislation was 
pivotal, and it has shed light on the CIA’s interrogation program, the 
extent of the CIA’s misrepresentations to the administration and 
Congress, and the ineffectiveness of torture. Future truth-telling 
mechanisms should bear both the report’s shortcomings, its successes, 
and its necessary compromises in mind if the world is to keep striving 
toward peace for victims and abolishing human rights violations and 
torture. 
 
